Resum:
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The commitment among agents has always been a difficult task, especially
when they have to decide how to distribute the available amount of a scarce
resource among all. On the one hand, there are a multiplicity of possible
ways for assigning the available amount; and, on the other hand, each agent
is going to propose that distribution which provides her the highest possible
award. In this paper, with the purpose of making this agreement easier, firstly
we use two different sets of basic properties, called Commonly Accepted Equity
Principles, to delimit what agents can propose as reasonable allocations.
Secondly, we extend the results obtained by Chun (1989) and Herrero (2003),
obtaining new characterizations of old and well known bankruptcy rules.
Finally, using the fact that bankruptcy problems can be analyzed from awards
and losses, we define a mechanism which provides a new justification of the
convex combinations of bankruptcy rules.
Keywords: Bankruptcy problems, Unanimous Concessions procedure,
Diminishing Claims mechanism, Piniles’ rule, Constrained Egalitarian rule.
JEL classification: C71, D63, D71. |