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Title:	Pure bargaining problems and the Shapley rule
Author:	Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Owen Salazar, Guillermo
Other authors:	Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtica Aplicada II; Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs
Abstract:	Pure bargaining problem are considered. By attaching a quasi-additive cooperative game to chatch one of them, a Shapley rule for this case of problems is derived from the classical Shapley value for games. The analysis of this new rule includes some axiomatic characterizations and a comparison with the classical proportional rule.
Subject(s):	-Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa -Game theory -Cooperative games (Mathematics) -Jocs, Teoria de -Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica) -Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory
Rights:	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
Document type:	Article - Submitted version Report
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