Título:
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Axiomatization of the nucl eolus of assignment games
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Autor/a:
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Llerena Garrés, Francesc; Nuñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)
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Otros autores:
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Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
Abstract:
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On the domain of general assignment games (with possible reservation prices) the core is axiomatized as the unique solution satisfying two consistency principles: projection consistency and
derived consistency. Also, an axiomatic characterization of the nucleolus is given as the unique
solution that satisfies derived consistency and equal maximum complaint between groups. As a
consequence, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus. Maschler et al. (1979)
provide a geometrical characterization for the intersection of the kernel and the core of a coalitional game, showing that those allocations that lie in both sets are always the midpoint of certain
bargaining range between each pair of players. In the case of the assignment game, this means
that the kernel can be determined as those core allocations where the maximum amount, that
can be transferred without getting outside the core, from one agent to his
/
her optimally matched
partner equals the maximum amount that he
/
she can receive from this partner, also remaining
inside the core. We now prove that the nucleolus of the assignment game can be characterized
by requiring this bisection property be satisfied not only for optimally matched pairs but also for
optimally matched coalitions.
Key words:
cooperative games, assignment game, core, nucleolus |
Fecha de creación:
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2014 |
Materias (CDU):
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33 - Economia |
Materia(s):
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Jocs cooperatius |
Derechos:
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L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
Páginas:
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16 p. |
Tipo de documento:
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Documento de trabajo |
Editor:
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Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
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Collection:
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Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2014-06
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