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Título:
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A mechanism to pick the deserving winner
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Autor/a:
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Moskalenko, Anna
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Otros autores:
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Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia; Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
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Abstract:
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A group of individuals is choosing an individual (the winner) among themselves,
when the identity of the deserving winner is a common knowledge among individuals.
A simple mechanism of voting by veto is proposed as an alternative to the mechanism
studied by Amorós (2011). Like Amorós’(2011), the suggested mechanism
implements the socially desirable outcome (the deserving winner is chosen) in
subgame perfect equilibria.
Keywords: Implementation, mechanism design, subgame perfect equilibrium,
individuals choosing among themselves, voting by veto.
JEL classification: C72, D71, D78 |
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Fecha de creación:
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2015 |
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Materias (CDU):
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33 - Economia |
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Materia(s):
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Jocs no-cooperatius (Matemàtica)
Elecció social |
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Derechos:
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L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
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Páginas:
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10 p. |
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Tipo de documento:
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Documento de trabajo |
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Editor:
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Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
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Collection:
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Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-20
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Compartir:
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