Título:
|
The number of parties and decision making in legislatures
|
Autor/a:
|
Bannikova, Marina; Jelnov, Artyom
|
Otros autores:
|
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia; Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
Abstract:
|
This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which
have to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist who is interested
in a certain outcome of the vote. We show that the ease of manipulating a legislature
decision by the lobbyist is increasing with the number of parties. A high threshold
leads to fewer parties represented, and consequently, decreases the ease of changing
a legislature decision by the lobbyist. On the other hand, a high threshold may
cause a misrepresentation of voters. We show that if the threshold is higher that
6%, the impact of the misrepresentation effect becomes significant. |
Fecha de creación:
|
2016 |
Materias (CDU):
|
32 - Política |
Materia(s):
|
Ciències polítiques -- Presa de decisions Partits polítics Grups de pressió |
Derechos:
|
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
Páginas:
|
8 p. |
Tipo de documento:
|
Documento de trabajo |
Editor:
|
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
|
Collection:
|
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2016-13
|
Compartir:
|
|