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Title:
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Norms of Judgement, Naturalism, and Normativism about Content
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Author:
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Díaz León, Encarnación
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Other authors:
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Universitat de Barcelona |
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Abstract:
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David Papineau [1999. "Normativity and Judgement." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73 (Sup. Vol.): 16-43.] argues that norms of judgement pose no special problem for naturalism, because all such norms of judgement are derived from moral or personal values. Papineau claims that this account of the normativity of judgement presupposes an account of content that places normativity outside the analysis of content, because in his view any accounts of content that place normativity inside the analysis of content cannot explain the normativity of judgement in the derivative way he proposes. Furthermore, he argues that normative accounts of content along those lines are independently problematic. In this paper I aim to respond to both objections, by arguing that normative accounts of content can be seen as naturalist accounts, even if they place normativity inside the analysis of content; and that normative accounts of content are compatible with a derivative account of norms of judgement of the sort Papineau advocates. |
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Subject(s):
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-Filosofia
-Naturalisme
-Philosophy
-Naturalism |
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Rights:
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(c) Taylor and Francis, 2016
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Document type:
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Article
Article - Accepted version |
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Published by:
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Taylor and Francis
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Share:
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