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Títol:
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Pure Nash equilibria in games with a large number of actions
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Autor/a:
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Álvarez Faura, M. del Carme; Gabarró Vallès, Joaquim; Serna Iglesias, María José
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Altres autors:
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Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Llenguatges i Sistemes Informàtics |
Abstract:
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We study the computational complexity of deciding the existence of a Pure Nash Equilibrium in multi-player strategic games. We address two fundamental questions: how can we represent a game?, and how can we represent a game with polynomial pay-off functions? Our results show that the computational complexity of deciding the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in an strategic game depends on two parameters: the number of players and the size of the sets of strategies. In particular we show that deciding the existence of a Nash equilibrium in an strategic game is NP-complete when the number of players is large and the number of strategies for each player is constant, while the problem is Sigma_2^p-complete when the number of players is a constant and the size of the sets of strategies is exponential (with respect to the length of the strategies). |
Matèries:
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-Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Informàtica::Informàtica teòrica -Strategic games -Nash equilibria -Complexity classes |
Drets:
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Tipus de document:
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Article - Versió publicada Informe |
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