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Títol:
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Sub-national deficits in European countries: The impact of fiscal rules and tax autonomy
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Autor/a:
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Foremny, Dirk
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Altres autors:
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Universitat de Barcelona |
Abstract:
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This paper empirically examines how fiscal rules and tax autonomy influence deficits of sub-national sectors across European countries. I use a new panel-data set to measure tax autonomy and the stringency of fiscal rules for EU15 regional and local government sectors over the period 1995 to 2008. I apply an instrumental variables approach to obtain an unbiased estimate of the impact of fiscal rules on deficits. I use political variables describing the central governments characteristics as instruments for fiscal rules at the sub-national level. The results show that the effectiveness of fiscal rules and tax autonomy depends on the constitutional structure. Fiscal rules decrease deficits only in unitary countries. Deficits of sub-national sectors in federations can be avoided through tax autonomy. |
Matèries:
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-Política fiscal -Dèficit públic -Deute tributari -Països de la Unió Europea -Fiscal policy -Budget deficits -Tax debt -European Union countries |
Drets:
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(c) Elsevier, 2014
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Tipus de document:
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Article Article - Versió acceptada |
Publicat per:
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Elsevier
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