The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games

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Title:	The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games
Author:	Izquierdo Aznar, Josep Maria; Rafels, Carles
Other authors:	Universitat de Barcelona
Abstract:	Within the class of superadditive cooperative games with transferable utility, the convexity of a game is characterized by the coincidence of its core and the steady bargaining set. As a consequence it is also proved that convexity can also be characterized by the coincidence of the core of a game and the modi ed Zhou bargaining set (Shimomura, 1997)
Subject(s):	-Teoria de jocs -Assignació de recursos -Funcions convexes -Game theory -Resource allocation -Convex functions
Rights:	(c) Springer Verlag, 2018
Document type:	Article Article - Accepted version
Published by:	Springer Verlag
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