On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability

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Title:	On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability
Author:	Hauk, Esther; Hurkens, Sjaak
Other authors:	Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
Abstract:	We analyze which normal form solution concepts capture the notion offorward induction, as defined by van Damme (JET, 1989) in the classof generic two player normal form games preceded by an outsideoption. We find that none of the known strategic stability concepts(including Mertens stable sets and hyperstable sets) captures this form of forward induction. On the other hand, we show that the evolutionary concept of EES set (Swinkels, JET, 1992) is always consistent with forward induction.
Subject(s):	-forward induction -strategic stability -ees sets -index theory -Microeconomics
Rights:	L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
Document type:	Working Paper
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