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Title:
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Law enforcement, municipal budgets and spillover effects: evidence from a quasi-experiment in Italy
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Author:
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Galletta, Sergio
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Notes:
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In this paper, I empirically investigate the presence of spillover effects resulting from the strengthening of law enforcement against corruption and organized crime in local governments. Specifically, I take advantage of an Italian law that gives power to the central government to replace democratically elected municipal officials who are potentially connected with mafia with a commission of non-elected administrators. Fixed effects model estimates that focus on a sample of municipalities from three Italian regions (Campania, Calabria and Sicilia) for the period 1998 to 2013 show that the city council dismissal of a municipality fosters a reduction in public investments in neighboring municipalities. Additional empirical evidence suggests that this result could be explained by the presence of law enforcement spillovers potentially reducing misconducts in neighboring municipalities. |
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Subject(s):
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-Màfia
-Corrupció
-Itàlia
-Mafia
-Corruption
-Italy |
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Rights:
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cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Galletta et al., 2016
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
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Document type:
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Working Paper |
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Published by:
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Institut d’Economia de Barcelona
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