|
Title:
|
Fiscal equalization under political pressures
|
|
Author:
|
Esteller Moré, Alejandro; Galmarini, Umberto; Rizzo, Leonzio
|
|
Notes:
|
We examine the design of fiscal equalization transfers aimed at interregional redistribution in a setting in which special interest groups distort the fiscal policies of local governments. Equity always calls for tax-base equalization while efficiency calls for tax-base equalization of fiscal capacities backed by strong lobby groups and for taxrevenue equalization of those backed by weak lobby groups. Hence, it is optimal to rely only on tax-base equalization if the special interest groups are similar in terms of lobbying power, whereas a mixed system is optimal if they are highly heterogeneous. Tax competition reinforces the role of tax-base, while tax exporting that of tax-revenue, fiscal equalization. |
|
Subject(s):
|
-Política fiscal
-Impostos
-Distribució (Teoria de la probabilitat)
-Fiscal policy
-Taxation
-Distribution (Probability theory) |
|
Rights:
|
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Esteller Moré et al., 2015
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
|
|
Document type:
|
Working Paper |
|
Published by:
|
Institut d’Economia de Barcelona
|
|
Share:
|
|
