dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
dc.contributor.author |
Zudenkova, Galina |
dc.date.accessioned |
2011-05-16T14:32:51Z |
dc.date.available |
2011-05-16T14:32:51Z |
dc.date.created |
2011 |
dc.date.issued |
2011 |
dc.identifier.issn |
1988 - 0812 |
dc.identifier.other |
T - 777 - 2011 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/151814 |
dc.format.extent |
22 |
dc.format.extent |
307642 bytes |
dc.format.mimetype |
application/pdf |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2011-06 |
dc.rights |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/) |
dc.subject.other |
Clientelisme |
dc.subject.other |
Burocràcia |
dc.subject.other |
Polítics |
dc.title |
Cronyism in Business, Public Sector and Politics |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.subject.udc |
32 - Política |
dc.description.abstract |
This paper contrasts the incentives for cronyism in business, the public sector and
politics within an agency problem model with moral hazard. The analysis is focused on the
institutional differences between private, public and political organizations. In business,
when facing a residual claimant contract, a chief manager ends up with a relatively
moderate rst-best level of cronyism within a firm. The institutional framework of the
public sector does not allow explicit contracting, which leads to a more severe cronyism
problem within public organizations. Finally, it is shown that the nature of political
appointments (such that the subordinate's reappointment is conditioned on the chief's
re-election) together with implicit contracting makes political cronyism the most extreme
case.
JEL classifi cation: D72, D73, D86.
Keywords: Cronyism; Meritocracy; Manager; Bureaucrat; Politician. |