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Títol:
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Complete voting systems with two types of voters: weightedness and counting
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Autor/a:
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Freixas Bosch, Josep; Molinero Albareda, Xavier; Roura Ferret, Salvador
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Altres autors:
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Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Llenguatges i Sistemes Informàtics; Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtica Aplicada III; Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs; Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. ALBCOM - Algorismia, Bioinformàtica, Complexitat i Mètodes Formals |
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Abstract:
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We investigate voting systems with two classes of voters, for which there is a hierarchy giving each member of the stronger class more influence or important than each member of the weaker class. We deduce for voting systems one important counting fact that allows determining how many of them are for a given number of voters. In fact, the number of these systems follows a Fibonacci sequence with a smooth polynomial variation on the number of voters. On the other hand, we classify by means of some parameters which of these systems are weighted. This result allows us to state an asymptotic conjecture which is opposed to what occurs for symmetric games. |
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Matèries:
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-Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Probabilitat
-Game theory
-Fibonacci numbers
-Jocs, Teoria de
-Fibonacci, Nombres de
-Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory |
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Drets:
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Tipus de document:
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Article - Versió publicada
Article |
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