The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core

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Title:	The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core
Author:	Llerena Garrés, Francesc; Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia
Other authors:	Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia; Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
Abstract:	In this paper, we characterize the non-emptiness of the equity core (Selten, 1978) and provide a method, easy to implement, for computing the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core (Dutta-Ray, 1991). Both results are based on a geometrical decomposition of the equity core as a finite union of polyhedrons. Keywords: Cooperative game, equity core, equal division core, Lorenz domination. JEL classification: C71
Publication date:	2013
Subject (UDC):	33 - Economia
Subject(s):	Jocs cooperatius
Rights:	L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
Pages:	13 p.
Document type:	Working Paper
Published by:	Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
Collection:	Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2013-15
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