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Título:
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Generalized three-sided assignment markets: consistency and the core
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Autor/a:
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Atay, Ata; Llerena Garrés, Francesc; Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)
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Otros autores:
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Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia; Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
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Abstract:
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A class of three-sided markets (and games) is considered, where value is generated by pairs or triplets of agents belonging to different sectors, as well as by individuals. For these markets we analyze the situation that arises when some
agents leave the market with some payoff To this end, we introduce the derived market (and game) and relate it to the
Davis and Maschler (1965) reduced game. Consistency with respect to the derived market, together with singleness best and
individual anti-monotonicity axiomatically characterize the core for these generalized three-sided assignment markets. These markets may have an empty core,
but we define a balanced subclass, where the worth of each triplet is defined as
the addition of the worths of the pairs it contains.
Keywords:
Multi-sided assignment market,
Consistency,
Core,
Nucleolus.
JEL Classification:
C71,
C78 |
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Fecha de creación:
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2014 |
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Materias (CDU):
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33 - Economia |
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Materia(s):
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Jocs cooperatius |
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Derechos:
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L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
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Páginas:
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19 p. |
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Tipo de documento:
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Documento de trabajo |
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Editor:
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Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
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Collection:
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Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2014-28
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Compartir:
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