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Title: | Egalitarian property for power indices |
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Author: | Freixas Bosch, Josep; Marciniak, Dorota |
Other authors: | Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtica Aplicada III; Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs |
Abstract: | In this study, we introduce and examine the Egalitarian property for some power indices on the class of simple games. This property means that after intersecting a game with a symmetric or anonymous game the difference between the values of two comparable players does not increase. We prove that the Shapley–Shubik index, the absolute Banzhaf index, and the Johnston score satisfy this property. We also give counterexamples for Holler, Deegan–Packel, normalized Banzhaf and Johnston indices. We prove that the Egalitarian property is a stronger condition for efficient power indices than the Lorentz domination. |
Abstract: | Peer Reviewed |
Subject(s): | -Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs -Game theory -Voting--Mathematical models -Cooperative game theory -power indices -egalitarian property -Lorentz domination -Jocs, Teoria de -Vot -- Models matemàtics -Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory |
Rights: | Attribution 3.0 Spain
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/ |
Document type: | Article - Published version Article |
Published by: | Springer |
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