To access the full text documents, please follow this link: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/144180

Title:	Assortative multisided assignment games. The extreme core points
Author:	Martínez de Albéniz, F. Javier; Rafels, Carles; Ybern, Neus
Other authors:	Universitat de Barcelona
Abstract:	We analyze assortative multisided assignment games, following Sherstyuk (1999) and Martínez-de-Albéniz et al. (2019). In them players’ abilities are complementary across types (i.e. supermodular), and also the output of the essential coalitions is increasing depending on types. We study the extreme core points and show a simple mechanism to compute all of them. In this way we describe the whole core. This mechanism works from the original data array and the maximum number of extreme core points is obtained.
Subject(s):	-Teoria de jocs -Matemàtica financera -Models matemàtics -Assignació de recursos -Game theory -Business mathematics -Mathematical models -Resource allocation
Rights:	cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Martínez de Albéniz al., 2019 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
Document type:	Working Paper
Published by:	Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
Share:

Show full item record