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Title:
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Political connections and informed trading: evidence from TARP
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Author:
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Akın, Özlem; Coleman, Nicholas S.; Fons‐Rosen, Christian; Peydró, José-Luis
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Abstract:
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We study insider trading behavior surrounding the largest bank bailout in history: TARP. In politically‐connected banks, insider buying during the pre‐TARP period is associated with increases in abnormal returns around bank‐specific TARP announcement; for unconnected banks, trading and returns are uncorrelated. Results hold across insiders within the same bank and are stronger for finance‐related government connections. Through a FOIA request we obtained the previously undisclosed TARP funds requested; the ratio of received to requested funds correlates both with abnormal returns and insider buying behavior in connected banks. |
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Abstract:
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Christian Fons‐Rosen acknowledges financial support by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (ECO2014–55555–P).José‐Luis Peydró acknowledges financial support from both ECO2015‐68182‐P (MINECO/FEDER, UE) and the European Research Council Grant (project 648398). |
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Subject(s):
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-Political connections
-Political economy in banking
-Insider trading
-TARP
-Bank bailouts |
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Rights:
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This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Akin O, Coleman NS, Fons‐Rosen C, Peydró J‐L. Political connections and informed trading: evidence from TARP. Financ Manage. 2019 Sep 3:1-48, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12292. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.
info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess |
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Document type:
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Article
Article - Accepted version |
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Published by:
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Wiley
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