Optimal monitoring to implement clean technologies when pollution is random

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dc.contributor.author	Macho Stadler, Inés
dc.contributor.author	Pérez-Castrillo, David
dc.contributor.author	Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica
dc.contributor.author	Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
dc.date	2007
dc.identifier	https://ddd.uab.cat/record/45265
dc.identifier	urn:oai:ddd.uab.cat:45265
dc.format	application/pdf
dc.language	eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation	Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica / Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). Working papers ;
dc.rights	open access
dc.rights	Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat, la unitat i l'institut i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús
dc.rights	https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/
dc.subject	Tecnologia Aspectes ambientals
dc.title	Optimal monitoring to implement clean technologies when pollution is random
dc.type	Working paper
dc.description.abstract	We analyze a model where firms chose a production technology which, together with some random event, determines the final emission level. We consider the coexistence of two alternative technologies: a "clean" technology, and a "dirty" technology. The environmental regulation is based on taxes over reported emissions, and on penalties over unreported emissions. We show that the optimal inspection policy is a cut-off strategy, for several scenarios concerning the observability of the adoption of the clean technology and the cost of adopting it. We also show that the optimal inspection policy induces the firm to adopt the clean technology if the adoption cost is not too high, but the cost levels for which the firm adopts it depend on the scenario.

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