Title:
|
Time-consistent unemployment insurance
|
Author:
|
Kankanamge, Sumudu; Weitzenblum, Thomas
|
Abstract:
|
This paper examines the optimal time-consistent unemployment insurance policy in a search economy with incomplete markets. In a context of repeated choice without a commitment device, we show that the optimal replacement rate depends on how frequently in time the policy can be revised. The exact relation is dependent on the political process: if the utilitarian welfare criterion is used, the optimal rate is higher the shorter the choice periodicity. Self-insurance reduces the need for the public scheme but mostly because the policy cannot be changed often enough. The comparison with an economy where a commitment device is assumed shows that the commitment rate is close to time-consistent rates with very long choice periodicities. |
Abstract:
|
The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396. |
Subject(s):
|
-Unemployment insurance -Time consistency -Commitment -Job search |
Rights:
|
open access
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, fins i tot amb finalitats comercials, sempre i quan es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original.
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
Document type:
|
Working paper |
Published by:
|
|
Share:
|
|
Uri:
|
https://ddd.uab.cat/record/196737
|