dc.contributor.author |
Levine, David K. |
dc.contributor.author |
Modica, Salvatore |
dc.date |
2016 |
dc.identifier |
https://ddd.uab.cat/record/196789 |
dc.identifier |
urn:oai:ddd.uab.cat:196789 |
dc.format |
application/pdf |
dc.language |
eng |
dc.publisher |
|
dc.relation |
European Commission 649396 |
dc.relation |
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics. ADEMU working paper series ; |
dc.rights |
open access |
dc.rights |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, fins i tot amb finalitats comercials, sempre i quan es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. |
dc.rights |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
dc.subject |
Organization |
dc.subject |
Group |
dc.subject |
Collusion |
dc.subject |
Public good |
dc.title |
Size, fungibility and the strengh of lobbying organizations |
dc.type |
Working paper |
dc.description.abstract |
How can a small special interest group successfully get an inefficient transfer at the expense of a much larger group with many more resources available for lobbying? We consider a simple model of collusive organizations that provide a public good in the form of effort and have a fixed cost per member of acting collusively. Our key result is that the willingness of such a group to pay for a/ngiven prize depends on whether the prize is fungible - that is, whether the prize can be used to pay for itself. If the prize is fungible, as in the case of a transfer payment, a smaller group always has an advantage. If the prize is non-fungible - civil rights for example - willingness to pay first increases then decreases with the size of the group. We use the theory to study agenda setting/nboth with and without blackmail by the politician showing that in general the small group is not too greedy: when it wins it optimally chooses to pre-empt the large group by choosing a prize small enough to equal the large group participation cost. |
dc.description.abstract |
The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396. |