dc.contributor.author |
Iriberri, Nagore |
dc.contributor.author |
Rey-Biel, Pedro |
dc.date |
2013 |
dc.identifier |
https://ddd.uab.cat/record/201196 |
dc.identifier |
urn:10.3982/QE135 |
dc.identifier |
urn:oai:ddd.uab.cat:201196 |
dc.identifier |
urn:recercauab:ARE-70378 |
dc.identifier |
urn:scopus_id:84887915039 |
dc.identifier |
urn:articleid:17597331v4n3p515 |
dc.identifier |
urn:wos_id:000330181500005 |
dc.identifier |
urn:altmetric_id:1913014 |
dc.identifier |
urn:oai:egreta.uab.cat:publications/598a4a11-e811-4647-b4ad-ce02dbdb32ae |
dc.format |
application/pdf |
dc.language |
eng |
dc.publisher |
|
dc.relation |
Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación ECO2011-25295 |
dc.relation |
Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2012-31626 |
dc.relation |
Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2012-31962 |
dc.relation |
Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología ECO2009-07616 |
dc.relation |
Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2012-31962 |
dc.relation |
Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2009/SGR-169 |
dc.relation |
Quantitative Economics ; Vol. 4 Núm. 3 (november 2013), p. 515-547 |
dc.rights |
open access |
dc.rights |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. |
dc.rights |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ |
dc.subject |
Belief elicitation |
dc.subject |
C72 |
dc.subject |
C91 |
dc.subject |
D81 |
dc.subject |
Experiments |
dc.subject |
Inequity aversion |
dc.subject |
Interdependent preferences |
dc.subject |
Mixture-of-types models |
dc.subject |
Social information |
dc.subject |
Social welfare maximizing |
dc.title |
Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games : What do dictators believe other dictators do? |
dc.type |
Article |
dc.description.abstract |
Using data from modified dictator games and a mixture-of-types estimation technique, we find a clear relationship between a classification of subjects into four different types of interdependent preferences (selfish, social welfare maximizers, inequity averse, and competitive) and the beliefs subjects hold about others' distributive choices in a nonstrategic environment. In particular, selfish individuals fall into false-consensus bias more than other types, as they can hardly conceive that other individuals incur costs so as to change the distribution of payoffs. We also find that selfish individuals are the most robust preference type when repeating play, both when they learn about others' previous choices (social information) and when they do not, while other preference types are more unstable. © 2013 Nagore Iriberri and Pedro Rey-Biel. |