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Título:
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Strike one to educate one hundred: organized crime, political selection and politicians’ ability
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Autor/a:
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Daniele, Gianmarco
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Notas:
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A central question in terms of political (self-)selection relates to the incentives leading high ability individuals to enter – or abstain from entering – into politics. In this article, we use data from Italian municipalities over the period 1985-2012 to empirically assess how changes in individuals’ expected payoffs affect political (self-)selection. Identification derives from murders of local politicians by the mafia, and indicates that such a negative shock to politicians’ expected payoffs induces a strong decrease in first-time elected politicians’ human capital. The effect is not limited to the municipality where a political murder takes place, but also extends to nearby municipalities. |
Materia(s):
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-Crim organitzat -Màfia -Eleccions -Polítics -Organized crime -Mafia -Elections -Politicians |
Derechos:
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cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Daniele, 2015
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
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Tipo de documento:
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Documento de trabajo |
Editor:
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Institut d’Economia de Barcelona
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Compartir:
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