To access the full text documents, please follow this link: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/165604

Reference without Cognition
Martí, Genoveva
This chapter criticizes the view, recently defended by David Kaplan and others, that uses of proper names semantically refer to their bearers in virtue of speakers’ having the referents in mind. It is argued that grounding semantic reference in cognition is contrary to the tenets that Kaplan himself contributed to establish in the revolution against descriptivism and internalism in semantics. It is argued also that the having in mind of an object is neither necessary nor sufficient for a use of a name to refer to its bearer. The criticisms lead to a reflection on the institution of naming and to a positive proposal: an externalist view, on which referring with uses of names requires that speakers join systematic, not necessarily social, linguistic practices.
-Filosofia del llenguatge
-Noms propis
-Philosophy of language
-Proper names
(c) Oxford University Press, 2015
Book Part
Article - Accepted version
Oxford University Press
         

Show full item record

Related documents

Other documents of the same author

Martí, Genoveva; Martínez Fernández, José
Martí, Genoveva; Ramírez Ludeña, Lorena
 

Coordination

 

Supporters