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<title>Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/2072/1745" rel="alternate"/>
<subtitle/>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/2072/1745</id>
<updated>2026-03-16T14:40:56Z</updated>
<dc:date>2026-03-16T14:40:56Z</dc:date>
<entry>
<title>Average monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/2072/535076" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Sudhölter, Peter</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/2072/535076</id>
<updated>2025-01-03T11:13:31Z</updated>
<published>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Average monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility
Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel; Sudhölter, Peter; Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia
A non-negative transferable utility (TU) game is average monotonic if there
exists a non-negative allocation according to which the relative worth is not
decreasing when enlarging the coalition. We generalize this definition to the
nontransferable utility (NTU) case. It is shown that an average monotonic
NTU game shares several properties with an average monotonic TU game.
In particular it has a special core element and there exists a population
monotonic allocation scheme. We show that an NTU bankruptcy game is
average monotonic with respect to the claims vector.
Keywords: nontransferable utility; average monotonicity; core; population
monotonicity
JEL classification: C71
</summary>
<dc:date>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Financial Inclusion and Women Economic Empowerment in Ghana</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/2072/535075" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Zelu, Barbara Ama</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Iranzo, Susana</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Pérez Laborda, Alejandro</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/2072/535075</id>
<updated>2025-01-03T10:46:52Z</updated>
<published>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Financial Inclusion and Women Economic Empowerment in Ghana
Zelu, Barbara Ama; Iranzo, Susana; Pérez Laborda, Alejandro
Although the impact of micro-credit and direct cash transfers on women economic empowerment
has been extensively studied. The impact of just having either a formal or informal bank account remains
relatively understudied. This paper uses a detailed national representative data of female household heads
in Ghana to analyze how having a formal and informal bank account economically empowers women. Using
propensity score matching, our results elicit that having a bank account encourages women to be employed
and also increases their per capita income. The results also indicate that, the level of education and sector
of employment positively contributes to women’s economic empowerment. Additionally, the result reveal that
female household heads living in the cities are more economically empowered than their counterpart living in
the rural areas.
Keywords: Financial Inclusion · Women Economic Empowerment · Gender Equality · Ghana
Jel Codes : D14, D63, G21, G22, O12, O16
</summary>
<dc:date>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Allocating remaining carbon budgets and mitigation costs</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/2072/535074" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Duro Moreno, Juan Antonio</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Sánchez-Soriano, Joaquín</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/2072/535074</id>
<updated>2025-01-03T10:36:02Z</updated>
<published>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Allocating remaining carbon budgets and mitigation costs
Duro Moreno, Juan Antonio; Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel; Sánchez-Soriano, Joaquín; Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia
The concept of carbon budgets has become a key and effective tool in
terms of communicating the existing environmental challenge and monitoring environmental policy, in the context of the Paris agreement. In this
sense, the literature has addressed different mechanisms to distribute them
by countries/groups according to reasonable distribution principles, among
which fairness and efficiency play an essential role. Given the problem of
agreeing on indicators by countries, the paper proposes the use of claims
models as a basis for this distribution, which avoid using indicators and
only have to agree on elements defining the distribution rules. In this sense
and based on a reference of the available global Carbon Budget (Mercator)
for 2018-2050, and the CO2 forecasts taken from the intermediate scenario
SSP2-45 (Middle of the road) considered by the IPCC (2021), different distribution rules are addressed proposed by the literature (equality, proportional, and α-min) and are evaluated for the available groups of countries.
Two relevant exercises are proposed beyond the initial distribution based on the previous theoretical rules: first, evaluate the cost of these distributions
in terms of the welfare of each group (in particular, in terms of GDP); and
two, use the GDP costs themselves to propose new distribution rules that
are cost-efficient. The results imply having not only a global cost-efficient
distribution proposal but also an annual path. We understand that the
work is useful not only in terms of its methodological proposal but also as
an alternative guide that structures future distribution policies.
Keywords: allocation methods; claims; carbon budgets; climate change
mitigation; equity
JEL classification: D7; H4; H8; Q58; Q54
</summary>
<dc:date>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>How to distribute the ERDF funds through a combination of egalitarian allocations: the CELmin</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/2072/535073" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Salekpay, Foroogh</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/2072/535073</id>
<updated>2025-01-03T10:33:32Z</updated>
<published>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">How to distribute the ERDF funds through a combination of egalitarian allocations: the CELmin
Salekpay, Foroogh; Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel
As Solís-Baltodano et al. (2021) figure out, almost a third of the total
European Union budget– has been set aside for the Cohesion Policy during
the 2014-2020 period. The distribution of this budget is made through three
main structural and investment funds, trying to provoke the convergence
in the level of development of EU countries. Specifically, the authors, by
analysing this situation as a claims problem (O’Neill, 1982), find out the
claims solution that performs better than the others by reducing inequality
promoting convergence to a greater degree (the constrained equal losses
rule). Nonetheless, when using this egalitarian division of losses, regions may
receive no amount of funds. This paper defines a new way to distribute the
limited resources of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). We
propose a compromise between the egalitarian approaches, i.e., we combine
the egalitarian division of the funds with an egalitarian division of the losses
(what regions do not get). In doing so, our proposal combines the constrained
equal losses solution with the ensuring of a minimum amount to each region
(sustainable bound). Finally, we provide an axiomatic analysis of the new
solution and we apply it to the ERDF problem.
Keywords: European Regional Development Fund; Conflicting claims
problems; Egalitarian distribution; Constrained equal losses
</summary>
<dc:date>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
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