On the coincidence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the core

All of RECERCAT

Use this identifier to quote or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/220221

Title:	On the coincidence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the core
Author:	Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel; Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia
Other authors:	Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia; Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
Abstract:	In this paper we prove that the Mas-Colell bargaining set coincides with the core for three-player balanced and superadditive cooperative games. This is no longer true without the superadditivity condition or for games with more than three-players. Furthermore, under the same assumptions, the coincidence between the Mas-Collel and the individual rational bargaining set (Vohra (1991)) is revealed. Keywords: Cooperative game, Mas-Colell bargaining set, balancedness, individual rational bargaining set. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.
Publication date:	2013
Subject (UDC):	33 - Economia
Subject(s):	Jocs cooperatius Economia del benestar Elecció social
Rights:	L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
Pages:	10 p.
Document type:	Working Paper
Published by:	Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
Collection:	Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2013-23
Share:

Files	Size	Format
201323.pdf	353.0 KB	PDF