dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
dc.contributor.author |
Calleja, Pere |
dc.contributor.author |
Llerena Garrés, Francesc |
dc.date.accessioned |
2016-08-30T10:34:36Z |
dc.date.available |
2016-08-30T10:34:36Z |
dc.date.created |
2016 |
dc.date.issued |
2016 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/266577 |
dc.format.extent |
29 p. |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.publisher |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2016-18 |
dc.rights |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.rights |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
dc.source |
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya) |
dc.subject.other |
Jocs cooperatius |
dc.title |
Consistency distinguishes the (weighted) Shapley value, the (weighted) surplus division value and the prenucleolus |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.subject.udc |
33 - Economia |
dc.embargo.terms |
cap |
dc.description.abstract |
On the domain of cooperative games with transferable utility, we investigate
how the main results in Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) vary when we
replace self consistency by projected consistency or max consistency. As a
consequence, we obtain several axiomatic comparison among the (weighted)
Shapley value, the (weighted) surplus division solution and the prenucleolus. |