Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output

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To access the full text documents, please follow this link: http://hdl.handle.net/2117/80825

dc.contributor	Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtiques
dc.contributor	Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs
dc.contributor.author	Freixas Bosch, Josep
dc.contributor.author	Parker, Cameron
dc.date	2015-12
dc.identifier.citation	Freixas, J., Parker, C. Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output. "Journal of mathematical economics", Dec 2015, vol. 61, p. 144-151.
dc.identifier.citation	0304-4068
dc.identifier.citation	10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.08.007
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2117/80825
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation	http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406815000981
dc.relation	info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AGAUR/PRI2005-2008/2009SGR1029
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject	Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs
dc.subject	Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística
dc.subject	Game theory
dc.subject	Voting--Mathematical models
dc.subject	Cooperative Games
dc.subject	Insincere Voting
dc.subject	Nash Equilibrium
dc.subject	(j
dc.subject	k)-games
dc.subject	Single-peaked preferences
dc.subject	Jocs, Teoria de
dc.subject	Vot -- Models matemàtics
dc.subject	Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory
dc.title	Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.description.abstract	In (j,k)-games each player chooses amongst j ordered options and there are k possible outcomes. In this paper, we consider the case where players are assumed to prefer some outcomes to others, and note that when k>2 the players have an incentive to vote strategically. In doing so, we combine the theory of cooperative game theory with social choice theory, especially the theory of single-peaked preferences. We define the concept of a (j,k)-game with preferences and what it means for it to be manipulable by a player. We also consider Nash equilibriums with pure strategies for these games and find conditions that guarantee their existence.
dc.description.abstract	Peer Reviewed

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