Título:
|
Time-consistent unemployment insurance
|
Autor/a:
|
Kankanamge, Sumudu; Weitzenblum, Thomas
|
Abstract:
|
This paper examines the optimal time-consistent unemployment insurance policy in a search economy with incomplete markets. In a context of repeated choice without a commitment device, we show that the optimal replacement rate depends on how frequently in time the policy can be revised. The exact relation is dependent on the political process: if the utilitarian welfare criterion is used, the optimal rate is higher the shorter the choice periodicity. Self-insurance reduces the need for the public scheme but mostly because the policy cannot be changed often enough. The comparison with an economy where a commitment device is assumed shows that the commitment rate is close to time-consistent rates with very long choice periodicities. |
Abstract:
|
The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396. |
Materia(s):
|
-Unemployment insurance -Time consistency -Commitment -Job search |
Derechos:
|
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium provided that the original work is properlyattributed.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
Tipo de documento:
|
Documento de trabajo |
Compartir:
|
|