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Title:
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Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit
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Author:
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Corchón, Luis C.; Dahm, Matthias
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Other authors:
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Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
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Resum:
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We analyze how a contest organizer chooses optimally the winner when the contestants'
efforts are already exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function
is not possible. We de…ne the notion of rationalizability in mixed-strategies to capture such
a situation. Our approach allows to derive different contest success functions depending
on the aims and attitudes of the decider. We derive contest success functions which are
closely related to commonly used functions providing new support for them. By taking into
account social welfare considerations our approach bridges the contest literature and the
recent literature on political economy.
Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function, Mixed-Strategies.
JEL Classi…cation: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political
Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances) |
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Publication date:
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2010 |
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Subject (UDC):
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338 - Situació econòmica. Política econòmica. Gestió, control i planificació de l'economia. Producció. Serveis. Turisme. Preus |
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Subject(s):
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Teoria de jocs
Ciències polítiques -- Models matemàtics
Presa de decisions |
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Rights:
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Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/) |
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Document type:
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Working Paper |
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ISSN:
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1988 - 0812
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Collection:
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Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2010-05
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Share:
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