Abstract:
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It is well known that, in distributions problems, fairness rarely leads to a single
viewpoint (see, for instance, Young (1994)). In this context, this paper provides
interesting bases that support the simple and commonly observed behavior of reaching intermediate agreements when two prominent distribution proposals highlight
a discrepancy in sharing resources. Specifi cally, we formalize such a conflicting
situation by associating it with a `natural' cooperative game, called bifocal distribution game, to show that both the Nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)) and the Shapley
value (Shapley (1953a)) agree on recommending the average of the two focal proposals. Furthermore, we analyze the interpretation of the previous result by means
of axiomatic arguments.
Keywords: Distribution problems, Cooperative games, Axiomatic analysis, Nucleolus, Shapley
value.
JEL Classi fication Numbers: C71, D63, D71. |