Title:
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Cooperation through social influence
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Author:
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Molinero Albareda, Xavier; Riquelme Csori, Fabián; Serna Iglesias, María José
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Other authors:
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Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtica Aplicada III; Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Ciències de la Computació; Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs; Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. ALBCOM - Algorismia, Bioinformàtica, Complexitat i Mètodes Formals |
Abstract:
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We consider a simple and altruistic multiagent system in which the agents are eager to perform a collective task but where their real engagement depends on the willingness to perform the task of other influential agents. We model this scenario by an influence game, a cooperative simple game in which a team (or coalition) of players succeeds if it is able to convince enough agents to participate in the task (to vote in favor of a decision). We take the linear threshold model as the influence model. We show first the expressiveness of influence games showing that they capture the class of simple games. Then we characterize the computational complexity of various problems on influence games, including measures (length and width), values (Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf) and properties (of teams and players). Finally, we analyze those problems for some particular extremal cases, with respect to the propagation of influence, showing tighter complexity characterizations. |
Abstract:
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Peer Reviewed |
Subject(s):
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-Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs -Game theory -Social influence -Cooperative games (Mathematics) -Computational complexity -Social networks -Computational complexity -Influence games -Simple games -Spread of influence -Jocs, Teoria de -Influència social -Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica) -Complexitat computacional -Xarxes socials -Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences |
Rights:
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Document type:
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Article - Submitted version Article |
Published by:
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Elsevier
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