dc.contributor.author
Ruiz del Portal, X. (Xavier)
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-05T22:05:12Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-05T22:05:12Z
dc.date.issued
2014-06-11T14:45:25Z
dc.date.issued
2014-06-11T14:45:25Z
dc.identifier
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13209-009-0003-x
dc.identifier
http://hdl.handle.net/10459.1/47314
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/10459.1/47314
dc.description.abstract
A method for dealing with monotonicity constraints in optimal control
problems is used to generalize some results in the context of monopoly theory, also extending the generalization to a large family of principal-agent programs. Our main conclusion is that many results on diverse economic topics, achieved under assumptions of continuity and piecewise differentiability in connection with the endogenous variables of the problem, still remain valid after replacing such assumptions by two minimal requirements.
dc.publisher
SpringerOpen
dc.relation
Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13209-009-0003-x
dc.relation
SERIEs, 2011. vol. 2, núm.1, p. 121–137
dc.rights
cc-by (c) Ruiz del Portal, 2010
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/deed.ca
dc.subject
Principal-agent problems
dc.subject
Monotonicity constraints
dc.subject
Non-smooth functions
dc.subject
Well-behaved solutions
dc.subject
Intervals of singularity
dc.title
Agency problems with non-smooth decision profiles: the case of monopoly under product quality
