Stand-alone renewable energy auctions: The case of Peru

dc.contributor.author
Lucas Porta, Hugo
dc.contributor.author
del Río, Pablo
dc.contributor.author
Cabeza, Luisa F.
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-05T22:11:17Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-05T22:11:17Z
dc.date.issued
2020-03-10T08:29:02Z
dc.date.issued
2022-02-24T23:17:25Z
dc.date.issued
2020
dc.date.issued
2020-03-10T08:29:04Z
dc.identifier
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esd.2020.01.009
dc.identifier
0973-0826
dc.identifier
http://hdl.handle.net/10459.1/68184
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/10459.1/68184
dc.description.abstract
Electrification policies are crucial to improve the welfare of rural populationsworldwide. In this context, auctions for the deployment of stand-alone solar home systems (SASHS) are an appropriate alternative to facilitate access to electricity in rural areas. The aim of this paper is to analyze the design elements and functioning of the SASHS auction in Peru in order to derive lessons for the effective and efficient design of those auctions. Based on an analytical framework developed elsewhere, this article draws on official documents and data, secondary material and interviews with stakeholders. Our results show that some design elements are particularly suitable in this regard. In contrast to renewable electricity auctions in general, for which the volume auctioned is usually set as capacity (MW) or generation (MWh), the volume of SASHS auctions should be set in terms of the number of SASHS providing an electricity service.Geographical diversity,with different auctions per region, would ensure the adoption of a minimum amount of SASHS in a given geographical area. Financial solvency, but not technical reputation, should be required. Otherwise, only the incumbents would be able to participate in the auction. The choice of technology-specific, price-only, sealed-bid, single-item auctions brings benefits in terms of economies of scale, lower support or transaction costs and a greater transparency or simplicity. A correction factor on the remuneration which accounts for the quality of the service, as applied in the Peru auction, is suitable for this type of auctions. Finally, provision of technical information, which facilitates the participation in the auction, and the implementation of a non-disclosed ceiling price are deemed appropriate. In contrast, given the lowpresence of local companies in the Peruvian PV market, the adoption of local content requirements would lead to higher support costs without significantly increasing the local development potential.
dc.description.abstract
The authors would like to acknowledge Mr. Julio Eisman Valdés forhis guidance and support and Mr. Mats Marquardt (Factor) for editingsupport. Dr. Cabeza would like to thank the Catalan Government forthe quality accreditation given to her research group GREiA (2017 SGR1537). GREiA is certified agent TECNIO in the category of technology de-velopers from the Government of Catalonia. This work is partially sup-ported by ICREA under the ICREA Academia program
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.language
eng
dc.publisher
Elsevier
dc.relation
Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esd.2020.01.009
dc.relation
Energy for Sustainable Development, 2020, vol. 55, p. 151-160
dc.rights
cc-by-nc-nd (c) International Energy Initiative, 2020
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subject
Electrification
dc.subject
Off-grid
dc.subject
Stand-alone solar home systems
dc.subject
Decentralized
dc.subject
Auctions
dc.subject
Peru
dc.title
Stand-alone renewable energy auctions: The case of Peru
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion


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