dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor.author
Theilen, Bernd
dc.date.accessioned
2009-05-26T15:16:48Z
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-10T13:31:39Z
dc.date.available
2009-05-26T15:16:48Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-10T13:31:39Z
dc.identifier.issn
1988 - 0812
dc.identifier.other
T - 546 - 2009
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/15843
dc.description.abstract
The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analyzed
in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for
managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a
firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed
which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets
on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes
of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when
aggregated firm data is used.
Journal of Economic Literature classiffication numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22.
Keywords: Cournot Competition, Contract Delegation, Moral Hazard, Entry, Market Size,
Wage Cost.
cat
dc.format.extent
473470 bytes
dc.format.mimetype
application/pdf
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2009-03
dc.rights
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/)
cat
dc.subject.other
Mercat de treball
ca
dc.subject.other
Oligopolis-Models economètrics
ca
dc.subject.other
Rendiment industrial
ca
dc.subject.other
Competència econòmica
ca
dc.title
Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives
ca
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
ca
