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Título:
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Decentralization of contracts with interim sidecontracting
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Autor/a:
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Theilen, Bernd, 1965-
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Otros autores:
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Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia; Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
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Resum:
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This paper gives a new explanation for the phenomena of subcontracting. A model
in which a principal contracts two agents who work in a sequence on a project, have soft
information and can collude is considered. Side-contracts between agents can be signed
at any stage of the game. Due to limited liability and moral hazard agents obtain a rent.
The principal’s problem is to find the preferable contracting structure. It is shown that in
this setting a decentralized contracting structure can be superior to a centralized structure
for the principal. The paper derives the conditions under which this holds.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22.
Keywords: Contract delegation, Collusion, Interim side-contracting, Moral hazard. |
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Fecha de creación:
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2011 |
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Materias (CDU):
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33 - Economia |
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Materia(s):
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Subcontractació |
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Derechos:
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Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/) |
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Tipo de documento:
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Documento de trabajo |
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ISSN:
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1988 - 0812
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Collection:
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Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2011-15
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Compartir:
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