dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
dc.contributor.author
Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel
dc.contributor.author
Peris, Josep E.
dc.date.accessioned
2012-03-27T13:10:51Z
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-10T13:29:15Z
dc.date.available
2012-03-27T13:10:51Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-10T13:29:15Z
dc.date.created
2012-03-21
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/182645
dc.description.abstract
In a distribution problem, and specfii cally in bankruptcy issues, the
Proportional (P) and the Egalitarian (EA) divisions are two of the most
popular ways to resolve the conflict. The Constrained Equal Awards rule
(CEA) is introduced in bankruptcy literature to ensure that no agent
receives more than her claim, a problem that can arise when using the
egalitarian division. We propose an alternative modi cation, by using a
convex combination of P and EA. The recursive application of this new rule
finishes at the CEA rule. Our solution concept ensures a minimum amount
to each agent, and distributes the remaining estate in a proportional way.
Keywords: Bankruptcy problems, Proportional rule, Equal Awards,
Convex combination of rules, Lorenz dominance.
JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.
eng
dc.publisher
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2012-04
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.source
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.other
Jocs cooperatius
dc.subject.other
Economia del benestar
dc.subject.other
Elecció social
dc.title
A Proportional Approach to Bankruptcy Problems with a guaranteed minimum
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
