dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
dc.contributor.author
Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel
dc.contributor.author
Peris, Josep E.
dc.date.accessioned
2012-03-27T13:17:48Z
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-10T13:29:39Z
dc.date.available
2012-03-27T13:17:48Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-10T13:29:39Z
dc.date.created
2012-03-23
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/182646
dc.description.abstract
The idea of ensuring a guarantee (a minimum amount of the resources) to
each agent has recently acquired great relevance, in both social and politi-
cal terms. Furthermore, the notion of Solidarity has been treated frequently
in redistribution problems to establish that any increment of the resources
should be equally distributed taking into account some relevant characteris-
tics. In this paper, we combine these two general concepts, guarantee and
solidarity, to characterize the uniform rules in bankruptcy problems (Con-
strained Equal Awards and Constrained Equal Losses rules).
Keywords: Constrained Equal Awards, Constrained Equal Losses, Lower
bounds, Bankruptcy problems, Solidarity.
JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.
eng
dc.publisher
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2012-05
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.source
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.other
Jocs cooperatius
dc.subject.other
Economia del benestar
dc.subject.other
Elecció social
dc.title
Solidarity and uniform rules in bankruptcy problems
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
