dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
dc.contributor.author
Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel
dc.contributor.author
Marco Gil, M. Carmen
dc.date.accessioned
2012-04-13T14:32:10Z
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-10T13:30:22Z
dc.date.available
2012-04-13T14:32:10Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-10T13:30:22Z
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/182719
dc.description.abstract
The solution for the ‘Contested Garment Problem’, proposed in the Babylonic
Talmud, suggests that each agent should receive at least some part of the resources
whenever the demand overcomes the available amount. In this context, we
propose a new method to define lower bounds on awards, an idea that has underlied
the theoretical analysis of bankruptcy problems from its beginning (O’Neill, 1982)
to present day (Dominguez and Thomson, 2006). Specifically, starting from the fact
that a society establishes its own set of ‘Commonly Accepted Equity Principles’, our
proposal ensures to each agent the smallest amount she gets according to all the admissible
rules. As in general this new bound will not exhaust the estate, we analyze
its recursive application for different sets of equity principles.
Keywords: Bankruptcy problems, Bankruptcy rules, Lower bounds, Recursive
process
eng
dc.publisher
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2012-06
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.source
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.title
A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper