Title:
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The proportional coalitional Shapley value
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Author:
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Alonso Meijide, José María; Carreras Escobar, Francisco
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Other authors:
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Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtica Aplicada II; Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs |
Abstract:
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We propose a modification of the Shapley value for monotonic games with a coalition structure. The resulting coalitional value is a twofold extension of the Shapley value in the following sense: (1) the amount obtained by any union coincides with the Shapley value of the union in the quotient game; and (2) the players of the union share this amount proportionally to their Shapley value in the original game (i.e., without unions). We provide axiomatic characterizations of this value close to those existing in the literature for the Owen value and include applications to coalition formation in bankruptcy and voting problems. |
Abstract:
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Peer Reviewed |
Subject(s):
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-Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs -Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Matemàtica aplicada a les ciències -Game theory--Mathematical models -Cooperative games (Mathematics) -Jocs, Teoria de -- Models matemàtics -Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica) -Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory |
Rights:
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Document type:
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Article - Published version Article |
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