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Title:
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The Lottery Blotto Game
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Author:
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Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel
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Other authors:
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Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia; Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
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Abstract:
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In this paper we relax the Colonel Blotto game assumption that for
a given battle the player who allocates the higher measure of resources
wins that battle. We assume that for a given battle, the Colonel who
allocates the higher measure of resources is more likely to win that battle.
We have a simpler model for which we are able to compute all Nash
equilibria in pure strategies for any valuations pro le that players might
have. Something that is not possible for the original Blotto game.
JEL: C72, D74, H56.
KEYWORDS: Colonel Blotto game; lottery contest function. |
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Publication date:
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2013 |
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Subject (UDC):
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33 - Economia |
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Subject(s):
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Jocs no-cooperatius (Matemàtica)
Gestió de conflictes
Seguretat nacional |
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Rights:
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L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
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Pages:
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7 p. |
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Document type:
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Working Paper |
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Published by:
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Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
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Collection:
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Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2013-05
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