dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
dc.contributor.author
Llerena Garrés, Francesc
dc.contributor.author
Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia
dc.date.accessioned
2013-06-13T07:52:21Z
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-10T13:33:58Z
dc.date.available
2013-06-13T07:52:21Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-10T13:33:58Z
dc.date.created
2013-05-28
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/212194
dc.description.abstract
In this paper, we characterize the non-emptiness of the equity core (Selten, 1978)
and provide a method, easy to implement, for computing the Lorenz-maximal allocations
in the equal division core (Dutta-Ray, 1991). Both results are based on a geometrical
decomposition of the equity core as a finite union of polyhedrons.
Keywords: Cooperative game, equity core, equal division core, Lorenz domination.
JEL classification: C71
eng
dc.format.extent
13 p.
cat
dc.publisher
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
cat
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2013-15
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.source
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.other
Jocs cooperatius
cat
dc.title
The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core
cat
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
cat
