dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
dc.contributor.author
Llerena Garrés, Francesc
dc.contributor.author
Mauri Masdeu, Llúcia
dc.date.accessioned
2014-05-05T16:12:05Z
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-10T13:34:33Z
dc.date.available
2014-05-05T16:12:05Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-10T13:34:33Z
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/228404
dc.description.abstract
In this note we introduce the Lorenz stable set and provide an axiomatic
characterization in terms of constrained egalitarianism and projection consistency. On the domain of all coalitional games, we find that this solution
connects the weak constrained egalitarian solution (Dutta and Ray, 1989)
with their strong counterpart (Dutta and Ray, 1991)
eng
dc.format.extent
11 p.
cat
dc.publisher
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
cat
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2014-07
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.source
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.other
Jocs cooperatius
cat
dc.title
A note on the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the imputation set
cat
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
cat
