dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
dc.contributor.author
Calleja, Pere
dc.contributor.author
Llerena Garrés, Francesc
dc.date.accessioned
2015-03-17T18:26:59Z
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-10T13:28:37Z
dc.date.available
2015-03-17T18:26:59Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-10T13:28:37Z
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/247807
dc.description.abstract
On the domain of cooperative transferable utility games, we investigate if there
are single valued solutions that reconcile rationality, consistency and monotonicity
(with respect to the worth of the grand coalition) properties. This paper collects
some impossibility results on the combination of core selection with either complement
or projected consistency, and core selection, max consistency and monotonicity.
By contrast, possibility results show up when combining individual rationality, projected
consistency and monotonicity.
eng
dc.format.extent
24 p.
cat
dc.publisher
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
cat
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-12
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.source
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.other
Jocs cooperatius
cat
dc.title
On the (in)compatibility of rationality, monotonicity and consistency for cooperative games
cat
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
cat
