Some Notes and Comments on the Efficient use of  Information in Repeated Games with Poisson Signals

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RECERCAT Home > Universitat Rovira i Virgili > Departament d'Economia > Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia > View document

Use this identifier to quote or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/249233

dc.contributor	Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor	Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
dc.contributor.author	Osório, António (António Miguel)
dc.date.accessioned	2015-04-22T15:53:22Z
dc.date.available	2015-04-22T15:53:22Z
dc.date.created	2015-03-23
dc.date.issued	2015
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2072/249233
dc.format.extent	13 p.
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-14
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights	L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.source	RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.other	Teoria de jocs
dc.subject.other	Informació, Teoria de la
dc.subject.other	Contractes -- Aspectes econòmics
dc.title	Some Notes and Comments on the Efficient use of Information in Repeated Games with Poisson Signals
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.subject.udc	33 - Economia
dc.embargo.terms	cap
dc.description.abstract	In the present paper we characterize the optimal use of Poisson signals to establish incentives in the "bad" and "good" news models of Abreu et al. [1]. In the former, for small time intervals the signals' quality is high and we observe a "selective" use of information; otherwise there is a "mass" use. In the latter, for small time intervals the signals' quality is low and we observe a "fine" use of information; otherwise there is a "non-selective" use. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Public Monitoring, Infor- mation Characteristics.

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