dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
dc.contributor.author
Moskalenko, Anna
dc.date.accessioned
2015-07-13T07:20:40Z
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-10T13:28:44Z
dc.date.available
2015-07-13T07:20:40Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-10T13:28:44Z
dc.date.created
2015-05-14
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/252215
dc.description.abstract
A group of individuals is choosing an individual (the winner) among themselves,
when the identity of the deserving winner is a common knowledge among individuals.
A simple mechanism of voting by veto is proposed as an alternative to the mechanism
studied by Amorós (2011). Like Amorós’(2011), the suggested mechanism
implements the socially desirable outcome (the deserving winner is chosen) in
subgame perfect equilibria.
Keywords: Implementation, mechanism design, subgame perfect equilibrium,
individuals choosing among themselves, voting by veto.
JEL classification: C72, D71, D78
eng
dc.format.extent
10 p.
cat
dc.publisher
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
cat
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-20
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.source
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.other
Jocs no-cooperatius (Matemàtica)
cat
dc.subject.other
Elecció social
cat
dc.title
A mechanism to pick the deserving winner
cat
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
cat
