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Título:	On the stability of generalized second price auctions with budgets
Autor/a:	Díaz Cort, Josep; Giotis, Ioannis; Kirousis, Lefteris; Markakis, Evangelos; Serna Iglesias, María José
Otros autores:	Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Ciències de la Computació; Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. ALBCOM - Algorismia, Bioinformàtica, Complexitat i Mètodes Formals
Abstract:	The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used typically to model sponsored search auctions does not include the notion of budget constraints, which is present in practice. Motivated by this, we introduce the different variants of GSP auctions that take budgets into account in natural ways. We examine their stability by focusing on the existence of Nash equilibria and envy-free assignments. We highlight the differences between these mechanisms and find that only some of them exhibit both notions of stability. This shows the importance of carefully picking the right mechanism to ensure stable outcomes in the presence of budgets.
Abstract:	Peer Reviewed
Materia(s):	-Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Informàtica
Derechos:	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
Tipo de documento:	Artículo - Versión presentada Objeto de conferencia
Editor:	Springer
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