dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
dc.contributor.author
Osório, António (António Miguel)
dc.date.accessioned
2016-04-14T17:11:02Z
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-10T13:28:15Z
dc.date.available
2016-04-14T17:11:02Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-10T13:28:15Z
dc.date.created
2015-10-29
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/260962
dc.description.abstract
This paper examines different Brownian information structures for varying time
intervals. We focus on the non-limit case and on the trade-offs between information
quantity and quality to efficiently establish incentives. These two dimensions of information tend to complement each other when signals quality is sufficiently high.
Otherwise, information quantity tends to replace information quality. Any conclusion
depends crucially on the rate at which information quality improves or decays with
respect to the discounting incentives.
JEL: C73, D82, D86.
KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Information Quantity, Information Quality.
eng
dc.format.extent
12 p.
cat
dc.publisher
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
cat
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-32
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.source
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.other
Jocs, Teoria de
cat
dc.subject.other
Teoria de la informació (Economia)
cat
dc.subject.other
Contractes -- Aspectes econòmics
cat
dc.title
Brownian Signals: Information Quality, Quantity and Timing in Repeated Games
cat
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
cat
