Searching for the ‘least’ and ‘most’ dictatorial rules

dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
dc.contributor.author
Bednay, Dezsö
dc.contributor.author
Moskalenko, Anna
dc.contributor.author
Tasnádi, Attila
dc.date.accessioned
2016-05-05T15:47:02Z
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-10T13:28:10Z
dc.date.available
2016-05-05T15:47:02Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-10T13:28:10Z
dc.date.created
2016-03
dc.date.issued
2016
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/261532
dc.description.abstract
We derive a least dictatorial social choice function by specifying a plausible metric above the set of social choice functions. Measuring conformity by counting the number of cases a voter believes to be the dictator, we obtain the plurality rule. Keywords: Voting rules, dictatorship, plurality rule. JEL Classification Number: D71.
eng
dc.format.extent
8 p.
cat
dc.language.iso
eng
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dc.publisher
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
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dc.relation.ispartofseries
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2016-04
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.source
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.other
Elecció social
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dc.title
Searching for the ‘least’ and ‘most’ dictatorial rules
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dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
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dc.subject.udc
32
cat
dc.subject.udc
33
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dc.embargo.terms
cap
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